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2: AFTER 1989: NATIONALISM AND THE NEW GLOBAL ELITE (15772 
words) 
 
After the events of June 1989, the credibility of the CCP’s claim to be a socialist 
organisation leading the nation to salvation was challenged not only by the social and 
ideological dislocation created by economic reform, but also by the diplomatic and 
economic sanctions imposed by the G7 states and the European Union. Over the years 
that followed, the articulation of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ began to 
take on added significance as the Party had to achieve the tasks set for it by Deng 
Xiaoping in the context of unassailable American military predominance, the 
liberalisation of international trade and financial markets, and the challenge of the 
information revolution.  
 
Yet the emerging post-Cold War order also presented opportunities. The demise of 
the Soviet Union removed the most serious military threat from China’s northern 
border, allowing a redeployment of forces to the South-eastern coast opposite Taiwan. 
Domestically, the poor condition of the Soviet successor states could also be held up 
as an example of what would happen if the CCP lost power. The defeat of Iraq in the 
first Gulf War could also be used by advocates of radical reform to underline the 
importance of linking technology with national defence if the task of opposing 
hegemonism was to be successful. The prospect of the transformation of the GATT 
into the WTO and the liberalisation of financial markets held out the possibility of 
greater access to FDI and foreign trade. The spread of the Internet and global media 
under commercialisation presented the promise of e-commerce and more efficient e-
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governance by integrating China’s provincialised domestic society and linking its 
economy with world markets.  
 
Deng Xiaoping thus drummed up confidence in the reform process by insisting that 
China should maintain the policies agreed by the Thirteenth Party Congress and 
proceed with opening up to the outside world, even establishing a number of new 
Hong Kongs to act as windows on the world. In order to meet the challenges of the 
post-Cold War era, though, the post-Tiananmen CCP leadership had first of all to 
rebuild the fragile consensus over ideology among the political elite that had existed 
before 1989. In the process, the movement from socialism to patriotism was 
accelerated as many of the themes associated with globalization discourse were 
incorporated into the party line.   
 
JIANG ZEMIN’S PATRIOTIC TURN 
The crisis of June 1989 had seriously strained the fragile modus vivendi over the 
meaning of ‘socialism’ that had held among the Party elite over the previous ten 
years. With Deng Xiaoping never having satisfactorily defined ‘socialism’, senior 
figures now criticised the degree of attention that had been paid to the privatisation of 
the state-owned sector, the pursuit of material wealth and the neglect of ideological 
strengthening. Even articles in the Party-controlled Beijing press pointed out that 
there might be some truth in the dissident argument that the introduction of market 
mechanisms into the economy would undermine the rule of the Party and fuel 
‘bourgeois liberalisation’. Deng’s proposition that it is hard to distinguish between 
socialism and capitalism was condemned for being a betrayal of Marxism, the CCP 
and the struggle of the masses to build socialism (Ma and Lin 1998: 183-4). 
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 What the older generation of leaders feared most after the demonstrations of 1989 was 
a Cultural Revolution-style mass movement from below. Their criticisms of Zhao 
Ziyang did not amount to a complete rejection of Deng’s line but were more of a call 
for greater emphasis on its moralistic and disciplinary elements. Writers and critics of 
the older generation, (some of whom had been inactive since the Yan’an period), 
attacked leading figures of the liberal and avant-garde cultural movements that had 
flourished in the late 1980s. The cult of Mao Zedong as the model of selfless morality 
that had been presented in the 1981 Resolution on Party History was revived. 
Similarly, artists and writers were called on to serve the workers, peasants and 
soldiers according to the principles of Mao’s ‘Yan’an Forum Talks on Literature and 
Art’, drawn up during the war against Japan and promoted again by Deng Xiaoping 
himself when he had addressed the Congress of Writers and Artists in October 1979 
(Barme: 20-37). 
 
When the Central Committee met for a plenary session on 23-24 June, laments went 
up over the way in which values of arduous struggle, selflessness, and helping people 
in need, ‘which make up the exalted character of a Communist and are also the 
traditional virtues of the Chinese people’, were now regarded as out- of- date (Nathan: 
433-6). When Jiang Zemin was appointed to the post of general secretary by the 
meeting, he sympathised with these anxieties by stating that it had been wrong to 
assume that a rise in living standards was enough to create social stability and the 
right conditions for political reform (1998i: 347). He also agreed that the growth of 
consumerism, short-termism, selfishness and the worship of foreign things was 
leading to a widespread trend of ‘looking to money in everything’ at the expense of 
 82
the state and the nation - a popular pun on the Chinese wording of the speech that 
marked Deng’s consolidation of power in December 1978 (Deng 1984b). Jiang also 
began to express his views about the political role of education, elaborating on the 
need for the young to be taught more about the ‘national condition’ (guo qing). By 
this he meant teaching the history of the last 100 years, the necessity of socialism, 
current economic conditions, economic resources and population, and the ‘excellent 
tradition of the Chinese nation’. He explained that this was necessary because, while 
the young supported ‘reform and opening’, many of them were still labouring under 
the illusion that Western material civilisation could be transferred to China over night 
(19981: 347).  
 
In November that year, Jiang went on to tell newsworkers that they had a 
responsibility to stimulate a spirit of nationalist pride, self-confidence, and activism 
and to educate society in patriotism, socialism, collectivism, self-reliance, hard 
struggle, and nation-building (1998b: 354-5). The Education Commission accordingly 
sent out instructions (EC 1989) for patriotism to permeate the entire curriculum, being 
taught not only in special courses but also in subjects like language, history and 
geography. ‘Communism’ was still to be  taught, but reduced to the stories of 
revolutionaries who illustrated the virtues of self-sacrifice for the interests of the 
collective and the need to always put the state before the individual.  In an April 1990 
report, the commission again stressed the anti-democratic and anti-Western aspects of 
this patriotic campaign by emphasising the need to defend education from foreign and 
domestic opponents of socialism, insisting that the battle against ‘bourgeois 
liberalisation’ and ‘peaceful evolution’ would continue for a long time and would get 
very heated. Schools would have to oppose these forces and learn from the experience 
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of 1989 by studying ideology, making moral and political education the priority, and 
shedding the idea that the only purpose of study is to get into university.  
 
With 1990 celebrated as the 150th anniversary of the Opium War, the new leadership 
was presented with something of a golden opportunity to alert the population against 
the foreign plot of ‘peaceful evolution’ by teaching them about the poverty and 
backwardness of ‘semi-colonised’ and ‘feudal’ old China, and the glorious 
achievements that had been made since the founding of ‘New China’. In this way, the 
Education Commssion explained, they would come to realise that ‘without the CCP 
there is no New China, only socialism can save China, only with socialism can a 
Chinese “way” (dao li) be developed; to have faith that China can support socialism, 
and that China can sufficienly develop socialism’ (EC 1990: 387-8). In a July 1990 
speech to mark the end of an exhibition on China’s revolutionary history, Jiang Zemin 
himself presented the Nanjing massacre as a valuable example that could be used to 
stir up popular anger, recommending the production of special text books for this 
purpose. In the same speech, he stressed how important it was to draw attention to 
negative examples of people who collaborated with foreign powers or worshipped 
foreign things and lacked all trace of ‘nationalist fibre’ (Jiang 1998c).   
 
Just as Deng had responded to the 1979 Beijing Spring by asserting the need for the 
young to be made to understand that western material civilisation could not be 
transplanted onto Chinese soil overnight, in 1990 Jiang chose the anniversary of the 
patriotic May Fourth Movement to decry critics of the Party because: ‘They don’t 
even want a national character or individual character, so what qualifications do they 
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have for talking about patriotism, democracy and human rights!’ Faced by the 
problem of what socialism had come to mean, Jiang finally took Deng Xiaoping’s 
thinking to its logical conclusion, announcing that ‘socialism’ and ‘patriotism’ are ‘by 
nature the same’ (benzhi shang shi tongyi de) (1998a: 360-1).  
 
FORGING THE NEW TECHNOCRATIC CONSENSUS 
The challenge for Jiang Zemin was very much like that faced by Zhang Zhidong at 
the end of the Qing dynasty and Hu Yaobang in the early 1980s, namely to craft 
patriotism in a way that would both please those in the leadership who longed for a 
return to the values of the ‘days before and after Liberation’, while also appealing to 
those who were more interested in the pursuit of technological and economic 
modernisation. This latter constituency was likely to be alienated by the measures 
taken after Tiananmen to deal with the immediate causes of social unrest, such as 
slowing the rate of economic growth and investment in order to reduce inflation and 
freezing aspects of education reform that had begun in 1985. Yet it is something of a 
misnomer to describe the key figures in the post-Tiananmen leadership as ‘Leftist’. 
Their technocratic nature is exemplified by a figure like Ding Guan’gen, who was 
appointed head of the United Front Department and head of the Party’s propaganda 
work in 1990. Like Jiang Zemin, an alumnus of Shanghai’s Jiaotong University, 
Ding’s previous political career had been in the railway industry.   
 
Even Premier Li Peng, while announcing a raft of measures for economic 
retrenchment in his 1990 work report to the National People’s Congress (1990), 
accepted the need to maintain ‘reform and opening’, albeit with a stress on the Four 
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Cardinal Principles and a protracted struggle against ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ (Li 
1990: 16-17). This was in the context of his announcement of the closure or merging 
of 70,000 corporations (24.5 percent of the country’s total), the severing of links 
between corporations and Party and government organisations, and the preferential 
allocation of funds, materials and transportation services to large and medium sized 
SOEs that produced high quality, readily marketable goods (Li 1990: 25). Meanwhile, 
strategies like the ‘863 Plan’ and the ‘Torch Plan’ and efforts to transform the largest 
SOEs into very large business groups not only survived the downfall of the pre-
Tiananmen leadership, but were expanded. In December 1991 some 55 burgeoning 
enterprise groups were selected for membership of what came to be called the 
‘national team’, and by the mid-1990s this had grown to 120 large enterprises being 
prepared for competition in the global market (Sutherland: 67-139).  
 
A number of ideological strategies could be adopted to shape patriotism in ways 
compatible with such policies. Li Ruihuan, for example, now a member of the 
Standing Committee of the Politburo, diverted the atavistic patriotism of the party 
elders towards the positive theme of a ‘Chinese rejuvenation' (zhenxing zhonghua), a 
term originally coined by Sun Yatsen. Within the context of elite politics, Li 
Ruihuan’s promotion of  ‘national culture’ (minzu wenhua) and ‘cultural flowering’ 
(fanrong wenyi) was more useful for restraining the purges that were being undertaken 
by the Ministry of Culture and the Department of Propaganda by focusing their work 
on a campaign against pornography that had already been in progress for some time. 
The mission to combat ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ could also be balanced with a call to 
oppose the ‘ossification’ (jianghua) of neo-Maoist dogmatism (Barme: 29). This 
strategy was similar to the way in which Hu Yaobang had moderated the meaning of 
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patriotism in order to deflate the anti-spritiual pollution campaign by limiting its 
scope to a rectification of Party work.  
 
A similar strategy can be seen in the approach of Education Commissioner Li Tieying 
to education reform in the context of the patriotic education campaign. When Li (1990) 
addressed a conference on the implications of the outcome of the Fourth Plenum for 
higher education in 1990, he certainly repeated the reduction of socialism to 
patriotism, opposition to the worshipping of foreign influences and the need for Party 
leadership. But he also emphasised the importance of realising the Four 
Modernisations and creating a ‘Chinese rejuvenation’. He then went on to advocate a 
number of managerial reforms that were consistent with the original 1985 plans for 
education, reiterating the importance of staying open to the outside world and 
engaging in international student exchanges. Addressing the Education Commission’s 
national work conference the following year, Li (1991) again reminded his audience 
that China would not only have to oppose the western strategy of ‘peaceful evolution’ 
in the last decade of the twentieth century, it would also have to deal with the 
challenge of the world technological revolution. 
 
Whatever their various motives, the location of figures like Li Tieying and Li Ruihuan 
along with Ding Guan’gen and Li Peng at the top of the Party had an important 
impact on the way that themes such as the technological revolution and ‘cultural 
renaissance’ were deployed by Jiang Zemin to legitimate the new leadership. This can 
be seen quite clearly in the way that Jiang was careful to add that, ‘Of course, there 
cannot be the creation of a new “Left” atmosphere either’, when he explained his 
ideas on patriotic education to Li Tieying and Party Secretary of the Education 
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Commission, He Dongchang (1991), in an open letter in People’s Daily. Before the 
Central Committee had issued its ‘Outline for Implementing Patriotic Education’ in 
August 1994, patriotism had thus already been modified and described as the ‘great 
power pushing forwards our country’s social history’. Its basic principles were to 
establish Deng Xiaoping’s project of building ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ 
and the facilitation of ‘reform and opening’ (CC 1994: 920).  
 
Any initiatives taken by Deng himself would of course have a decisive impact on the 
interpretation of his legacy. Given his age and failing health, the views he promoted at 
this time have to be understood as shaped by a number of constituencies upon whom 
he relied, or who were close enough to influence him. High among these was the 
‘imperial bodyguard’ under the Sichuanese brothers, Yang Shangkun and Yang 
Baibing, who held power over the Central Military Commission and the Central Party 
Secretariat (Nathan: 456). Aware of the technological backwardness of the armed 
forces following the spectacle of United States power in the Gulf War, such military 
personnel were sympathetic to the view that success in the reform process was 
essential if the PLA was ever to become a professional fighting force. 
 
Then there was the Shanghai Party, the rival power base from where Deng could 
launch an ideological campaign in much the same way that Mao Zedong had launched 
the Cultural Revolution nearly three decades earlier. The mayor of the city, Zhu 
Rongji, an alumnus of the science and technology-based National Tsinghua 
University in Beijing, had served as deputy secretary of the Shanghai party under 
Jiang Zemin. His managerial outlook is summed up by the way he described Shanghai 
as the ‘model executive area’ for the planned economy. Although he had been 
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labelled a ‘Rightist’ in the 1950s, he had displayed unwavering loyalty to the Party, 
remarking that ‘If a mother beats her child by mistake, how can the child hate its 
mother’ (Gao, X.: 83-6). While Zhu’s appointment to the Standing Committee of the 
Politburo at the Fourteenth Party Congress, and to the Premiership in 1998, is often 
described as the formation of a ‘Shanghai faction’, such an alliance had to be 
acceptable to a broad section of the Party elite if it was to be effective.  
 
While Zhu came to be known as an economic reformer, one of his sponsors was in 
fact Song Ping, then head of the Central Party Organisation Department and soon to 
labelled by radical reformers as a ‘Leftist’. Song (b. 1928) was older than Zhu, but he 
too was a Tsinghua alumnus. Song is said to have been impressed by Zhu’s 
participation in the ‘red student movement’ and the two had worked together in the 
1950s in the Northeast bureau of the Party and on economic planning.  Given such 
personal relationships, Yuan Ming, a former deputy head of the theoretical research 
office of the Central Party School, has described members of the ‘Shanghai faction’ as 
forming a bridge between the extremes represented by the economic planner Chen 
Yun and the advocate of market mechanisms, Deng Xiaoping (Yuan, M). 
 
Deng was also under the influence of his immediate family, and ultimately their 
control, as he increasingly relied on them for physical support. His daughter, Deng 
Nan, became one of the most powerful figures in the country because she could 
control access to Deng, and eventually even had the privilege of interpreting his 
increasingly unintelligible utterances. Her positions as director of the National 
Science and Technology Committee of the State Council and deputy director of the 
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Central Committee’s Social Development Science Research Committee, clearly 
identify Deng Nan with techno-nationalism. Being the descendant of a Party leader 
also makes Deng Nan representative of what has come to be called the ‘princeling 
party’ in Chinese discourse. Jiang Zemin’s son, Jiang Mianheng, similarly boasts a 
long list of directorships of Internet firms, and his appointment as vice-president of 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences was to make him something of a spokesman for the 
electronics industry.  
 
Dropping any pretensions to communism, the ‘princelings’ have tended to be 
sympathetic to the idea of ‘neo-authoritarianism’, floated before Tiananmen by 
various academics and personal assistants of Zhao Ziyang. Drawing on the theories 
developed by Harvard political scientist, Samuel Huntington, from Latin American 
case studies, they could argue that China had to go through a period of economic 
modernisation under an authoritarian state before democracy is possible. Looking to 
societies like the Asian Tigers as the model for development, they claim that 
Confucian collectivism, the family, hard work, frugality and a hierarchical, patriarchal 
power structure are the values that underpin prosperity. Although ‘neo-
authoritarianism’ had been proscribed, its central themes had been given a new degree 
of credibility by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and reappeared in September 1991 
with the publication of an article under the auspices of China Youth Daily (Zhongguo 
qingnian bao). This urged the leadership to base its claim to power on nationalism 
and draw on traditional culture to develop its ideological vision to legitimate the state, 
given that Marxism-Leninism could no longer mobilise the population (Zhao, S. 
1992: 733). 
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TOWARDS ‘DENG XIAOPING THEORY’ 
The first step in the consolidation of a post-Tianananmen ideological consensus 
between these various constituencies took place when Deng Xiaoping retreated to 
Shanghai in the winter of 1990/91. While there he collaborated with the editorial team 
of the city’s Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao) to produce a series of articles under the 
pen-name ‘Huang Puping’. These remarkable texts, which might be taken as the start 
of Shanghai’s remarkable rise to an icon of globalization, regretted that the city had 
not been made one of the first SEZs and urged the population to restore the city’s role 
as a financial centre and to take a more active role in regenerating the Yangtze delta. 
They sent shockwaves throughout the country when they directly addressed the 
debate on the nature of socialism by restating the view that market mechanisms 
should play a more important role in the economy and called on the people of the city 
to be more daring in creating an open environment suitable for an advanced 
international city, a ‘socialist Hong Kong’ (Ma and Li: 171-3).  
 
Given the emphasis on patriotism in the ideological discourse of the time, the Huang 
Puping articles adopted an ingenious strategy for capturing the ideological high groud 
by combining modernising themes with the narrative of national salvation. This can 
be seen in the way that the first article in the series appeared under the title ‘Be the 
“Lead Ram” for Reform and Opening’. This is a reference to the traditional Chinese 
twelve-year cosmological cycle, according to which 1991 was the ‘Year of the Ram’. 
The last such year just happened to be 1979, which the article claimed to be the start 
of the era of ‘reform and opening’, described as ‘the only road for a strong state and 
wealthy people’ (qiang guo fu min). Just as convenient, though, was that the longer 
sixty-year cosmological cycle happened to have begun in 1931, the year that Japan 
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invaded northern China. The writers could thus neatly contrast the situation at that 
time with expectations for the end of the next 60-year cycle in 2051, when ‘socialist 
China will have reached the glorious period of a semi-advanced level. Our per-capita 
income will have reached US$4,000, which will have put the “comprehensive 
national power’ of our big country of over a billion people at the forefront of the 
world’. 
 
The use of nationalist themes to legitimate a radical reform agenda became fully 
systemitised and took an authoritative form the following winter, when Deng 
Xiaoping made his ‘Southern Tour’ of the cities of Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and 
Shanghai in January and February 1992. This was a crucial event for political 
developments, because the speeches made by Deng on these visits were used to sway 
the outcome of the Fourteenth Party Congress in October, when Jiang Zemin 
announced that the spirit of the Southern Tour was to be taken as the basic line of his 
work report and to arm the whole party in carrying out its responsibilities under the 
formula of ‘Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s Theory of Building Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics’ (Jiang 1992: 1-2). The canonical status of the Southern Tour within 
Deng’s ideological heritage was further consolidated when it became the final chapter 
of the third volume of his selected works, published in October 1993 (Deng, 1993o).  
 
The symbolic significance of using the ‘Southern Tour’ to settle the ongoing debate 
over the nature of socialism lies partly in its similarities with the journeys that China’s 
emperors used to make when they inspected conditions in the provinces in centuries 
past. It also has a more recent historical resonance, though, in the way that it parallels 
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Deng’s termination of the campaign against ‘spiritual pollution’ by visiting the SEZs 
in Guangdong and Fujian in February 1984. In 1992 the Southern Tour was again 
used as an opportunity to articulate anew the themes that had been developed during 
the period of ‘reform and opening’, establishing new boundaries for the discussion of 
the relationship between socialism, nationalism and globalization. Within this 
discourse the aims of the Party remain the three tasks of economic development, 
national unification and opposing international hegemony that were established in 
1980. Yet the spectre of the world technological revolution finally allows Deng to 
present his view that socialism means no more than raising national production as the 
final decision in the ongoing debate over how to distinguish whether a policy has a 
‘socialist nature’ or a ‘capitalist nature’ that had raged since Tiananmen.  
 
One crucial political implication of this development of ideology is that Deng created 
a new orthodoxy according to which the status of the rising professional classes could 
be established as ‘revolutionary’. This was because ‘revolution’ (geming) had become 
synonymous with ‘the liberation of productive forces’, and science and technology 
had become ‘the primary productive force’ (Deng 1993o: 377-8).  Thanking workers 
in science and technology for the glory of their contributions to the nation, he called 
on everybody to remember the age when the physicists Qian Xuesen, Li Siguang and 
Qian Sanqiang had been able to produce the ‘two atomic bombs and one satellite’ 
(377-8).  
 
The rationale presented in Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour text for faster growth and 
greater openness to outside influences is thus part of a political strategy to ensure the 
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continuation of the Party’s monopoly on power. Deng’s reduction of socialism to the 
liberation of productive forces is the logical outcome of his view that Party rule would 
not have survived Tiananmen if the population had not experienced a rising standard of 
living throughout the 1980s. The alternative, he warns, would have been a civil war 
similar to the conflict of the Cultural Revolution.  Although the notion of 
egalitarianism is not entirely absent from the speech, it is clear that the measure of 
efficiency is to be the national interest rather than the interests of any particular class. 
Even when Deng explains that socialism aims to prevent exploitation and polarisation 
and eventually to build common prosperity, he claims that this is to avoid a 
polarisation between the coastal and interior regions that could have a negative impact 
on national unity rather than being due to an ethical commitment to egalitarianism 
(373). Such caution is necessary because his vision of rapid development inevitably 
means encouraging some areas of the country to develop more quickly than others. 
Guangdong is thus to be allowed to catch up with the Four Tigers within twenty years, 
while less developed areas will have to wait until the end of the century to reach such 
a level through the transfer of technology and revenue from the more advanced 
regions.  
 
Rather than be concerned over Marxist orthodoxy, Deng thus admonishes the Party 
not to behave like a ‘woman with bound feet’. If socialism is to achieve a comparative 
advantage over capitalism, it should ‘boldly absorb and borrow all the fruits of 
civilisation created by human society, absorb and borrow all the advanced ways of 
enterprise and management that reflect the rules of production that modern society has 
created in all the countries of the world including the advanced capitalist ones’.  To 
meet this challenge, he urges boldness in experimenting with measures such as the 
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introduction of stock markets and the expansion of foreign investment. So long as 
‘our heads are clear’, he explains, there is no need to be timid, because state control 
can quickly be exerted again after a year or two.  
 
This departure from socialist ideology should not, of course, be mistaken for a 
commitment to political liberalisation. Instead, the displacement of  egalitarianism and 
the elevation of science are the conditions for formulating an ideology appropriate for an 
authoritarian developmental state. The models closest to hand are  neighbouring 
economies like Japan, South Korea and ‘some in Southeast Asia’. Although, as Deng 
points out, the comparatively rapid development of these neighbours presents a bleak 
comparison with China’s own condition, their experiences show that it is possible to 
go through periods of over-heated growth without being overly concerned about 
social stability. The concentrated power of the one-party system is what will make it 
possible for China to go through its own rapid stage of rapid economic growth. Deng 
left little doubt that his formula had come closer to the thinking of Lee Kuan Yew 
than Karl Marx when he cited Singapore as a model to be emulated in the search for 
the right relationship between ideology and economic development (Deng, 1993o: 
377-8).  
 
That Deng’s openess to foreign ideas and practices should not be  confused with 
political liberalisation is made clear by the way in which the first chapter of Deng’s 
selected works is his statement to the Twelfth Congress, in September 1982, where he 
warns that learning from abroad must not involve subordination to any foreign power 
or permit ‘rotten thinking’ to be imported and spread a bourgeois life-style (1993c: 1-
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4). He explains further in May 1985 that sucumbing to foreign cultural influences not 
only poses a threat to unification with Taiwan, but to the unity of the Chinese mainland 
itself. The reason for ‘reform and opening’, moreover, is not the promotion of the rights 
of individuals or minorities, which should be firmly subordinated to the rights of the 
majority and interpreted in China’s own context (1993p: 124).  
 
The inclusion of Deng’s speech to the Second Plenum in 1983, in which he warns 
about the general lack of enthusiasm for socialism and the Party, the growing interest 
in individualism and Western ‘modernism’ (xiandai pai) and the commercialisation of 
culture, shows how these themes remained as relevant to the technocratic leadership 
that was moving moved towards a market-based economy in 1993, as they had been 
for ideological ‘conservatives’ ten years before. The same is true for the inclusion of 
Deng’s September 1986 call for the struggle against ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ to carry 
on for another 20 years. In the Southern Tour text, he could take this further by adding 
that the consolidation of the socialist system will require  fighting bourgeois 
liberalisation through ‘our own few generations, more than ten generations, or even 
tens of generations’ (1993o: 383). The condition for success in this venture is that the 
CCP must hold political power and defend national integrity through a policy of 
‘grabbing with two hands’, with ‘one hand reforming and opening, one hand striking 
hard at all kinds of criminal activities’. (1993o: 379).  
 
This, then, is the formula according to which China can preserve its sovereignty while 
reaping the benefits of the international economic system. Indeed, the most 
pronounced difference between the third volume of Deng’s selected works and the 
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two that came before lies in the amount of material that is devoted to international 
affairs. No less than 97 of the 119 texts are concerned with diplomacy, international 
relations and changes in the global environment. The result is a complex narrative that 
characterises the emerging post-Cold War international situation as one of developed 
states encouraging small wars between developing states. In this situation China is the 
victim of two new cold wars, one between the North and the South and the other being 
the war against socialism while the G7 states are presented as the old imperial powers 
(Deng 1993q). Bent on replacing the superpowers as the international hegemon, they 
have imposed sanctions on China under the pretext of promoting democracy and human 
rights, but in reality to pursue their own interests under the pretext of putting ‘human 
rights’ (ren quan) above ‘state rights’ (Deng 1993r).  
 
The overall effect of the ideology in the third volume of Deng’s selected works is thus 
to modernise the narrative of the CCP as the only organisation that can save China 
from the continuing aggression of the old imperialists, taking the nation forward into 
the global era under the protection of a strong state. Continuing this will only be 
possible if China becomes one of three or four poles of global power, as Cold War 
bipolarity gives way to a multipolar international order. The outcome to be avoided at 
all costs is the emergence of an unbalanced United States, at liberty to fight a 
‘smokeless war’ against socialism in its determination to stop China developing to a 
level where it might become a rival. The neo-liberal belief that China can be 
transformed through market mechanisms is thus condemned as a policy of ‘peaceful 
evolution’, amounting to nothing more than a conspiracy to bring about chaos in the 
socialist states (1993t: 325). The result is an intensely state-centric vision of foreign 
policy. As Deng reminds a visiting Richard Nixon: if chaos is to be avoided, 
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international politics will have to be conducted according to the pursuit of national 
interests while refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of other states (Deng 
1993u). Moreover, the imposition of sanctions can be transformed into a positive force 
to mobilise the population behind the Party as Deng insists that China cannot afford to 
appear soft when subjected to international pressure, and must be prepared to resist 
invaders (Deng 1993v).  
 
The significance of this ideological formula in Deng’s Southern Tour can be seen in 
the way that all of its themes were deployed when Jiang Zemin took another step 
towards the creation of a market economy when he reported to the Fourteenth Party 
Congress in October 1992. Under the rather oxymoronic theory of the ‘socialist 
market economy’ (shehui zhuyi shichang jingji), the state was to withdraw from 
central planning and rely on macro-economic controls to regulate an economy that 
would increasingly be disciplined by market principles. There would be losers as well 
as winners, as enterprises would feel the pressure to become more efficient and active, 
with only the fittest surviving. On this road to ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, 
however, the ideological prescription was still to avoid copying foreign models. 
Moreover, although the end goal was still supposed to be socialism, it would be a long 
wait, because the ‘primary stage of socialism’ would last for at least another 100 
years. To achieve this, international peace and an ‘independent and self-reliant’ 
foreign policy also had to be maintained, so that opening up to the outside would 
allow absorption of the advanced fruits of the civilisation of all countries, including 
the advanced capitalist ones, for developing socialism. 
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Jiang could also reiterate Deng’s principle that the criterion for judging policy was 
whether it was ‘good for socialist production and good or bad for increasing the 
comprehensive national power of the socialist state, good or bad for raising the 
standard of living of the people’. Science and technology had become the ‘primary 
productive force’, and reform had become ‘a kind of revolution and a kind of 
liberation of productive forces’. The political guarantee for building socialism 
remained adherence to  the Four Cardinal Principles, yet these were were to be ‘filled 
with new content’ from the process of reform and opening and modernisation. While 
he accepted that poverty was not socialism, it was not possible for everybody to 
become wealthy at the same time. So some areas and people should be allowed and 
encouraged to get wealthy first, pulling up others behind them. Opportunities to build 
socialism through bursts of rapid and efficient development should be ‘grasped’, with 
each spurt lasting a few years and leading to new stage of development. In the 
process, the life and death of the Party would be determined by its work style and its 
links with the masses. National unification remained an objective, through the 
cultivation of links with patriots and promoting the formula of ‘one country, two 
systems’. 
 
Just as with Zhang Zhidong’s attempt to preserve Chinese ‘ti’ by using Western 
‘yong’, many of the themes deployed in Jiang’s speech to the Fourteenth Congress 
appear to be contradictory from the perspective of theories that assume globalization 
will weaken nationalism and the authoritarian state. Yet the proliferation of 
dichotomies does make sense as an attempt to create the limits of a discourse that can 
accommodate a range of political constituencies within boundaries that do not permit 
any challenge to CCP rule. The concept of the ‘socialist market economic system’ is 
 99
such a dichotomy, which leaves space for the arguments of both those who advocate 
planning and public ownership and those who want more rapid introduction of market 
mechanisms.  
 
Accepting that patriotism means loyalty to the CCP is the minimum requirement for 
participation in this debate. In his comments on the Southern Tour, Jiang could thus 
call on cadres to focus on Deng’s call for a policy of ‘grabbing with two hands’, in 
terms of constructing a flourishing spiritual civilisation based on academic freedom 
and work in the arts and media, while at the same time hardening the policy of 
eradicating all ‘evil phenomena’. In January 1993, after consolidation of the reform 
process, he places more emphasis on the propagation of traditional Chinese culture 
and modern and contemporary Chinese history, strengthening selfless morality to 
enable cadres to pass the test of ‘money, power and beautiful women’, strengthening 
education in Marxist dialectical materialist method, and strengthening education in 
unity (1998f: 393).  
 
By the end of 1993, Jiang could describe Deng’s theory of ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’ as the ‘continuation and development of Mao Zedong Thought, 
Marxism for the present age, the great banner for our socialist venture and the mighty 
spiritual pillar of the revival of the Chinese nation (minzu)’ (1993g: 411). Taken 
together, Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour, the Fourteenth Party Congress and the 
third volume of Deng’s selected works provide the core themes around which the 
post-Tiananmen CCP leadership has built its legitimacy. They present an 
interpretation of reality in which the CCP is presented as the party of national 
salvation, implementing a market-orientated economic reform process within a 
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multipolar post-Cold War international situation, harnessing the forces of technology 
to ensure the survival of the Chinese nation-state in a globalising world (Jiang, 1998h: 
408-9).  
 
TEACHING THE NATION 
In 1987 Fang Lizhi had been expelled from the CCP for claiming that ‘reform and 
opening’ had given intellectuals the highest political status because they represented 
the most advanced forces of production. The difference between Fang’s views and the 
treatment of ‘science and technology’ in Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour, is that Fang 
had seen the prospect of a revival of nationalism as promising a return to ‘feudalism’ 
and he lauded science for the global community it created, approved of its integration 
into Western democratic societies and approved of internationalist minded scientists 
like Albert Einstein, even though he realised that their ideals were unlikely to be 
realised (Fang 1986: 32-3). Moreover, he did not think that economic development 
was the criterion of an advanced society, which had to be measured above all by its 
intellectual achievements. 
 
Internationalism and democracy had become the antithesis of Deng’s thinking on 
science, however. Instead, the linkage between science and the nationalist narrative 
had become so strong for him that he could go so far as to explain that the defeat of 
imperialism and feudalism could only be described  as ‘revolutionary’ because it 
liberated the productive forces of the Chinese people. Whether a policy is socialist or 
capitalist in nature had come to depend on not on the way in which at impacted on 
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class relationships, but on whether it measures up to the ‘Three Benefits’ (san ge 
liyou) of  whether it is ‘good or bad for benefiting the development of social 
production in socialist society, good or bad for benefiting an increase in the 
comprehensive national power of the socialist country (guojia), good or bad for 
benefiting the rising living standards of the people’ (Deng 1993o: 372). 
 
This political role of science and technology was reflected when the Central 
Committee and State Council issued a resolution on speeding up the development of 
science and technology soon after the passing of a new Election Law in 1995. From 
then on, the slogan ‘science and education rejuvenate the country’ (ke jiao xing guo)’ 
would be used to explain the party line of putting economic development first, that 
had been established back in 1978 (CC 1995: 1344-5). The way in which the forces of 
globalization had been appropriated within nationalist discourse is illustrated by the 
way in this resolution stated that ‘Strength in science and technology has already 
become an important factor in deciding the comprehensive national power and 
international status of the country’ (CC 1995: 1343-4). 
 
That the articulation of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ as a version of 
patriotism that can incorporate many of the themes of globalization more than just 
rhetoric, can be demonstrated by looking at how the patriotic education campaign was 
adapted to respond to the broader economic demands being made on education. As a 
member of the Education Commission explained, if each of the 200,000 village 
enterprises that had come to play a crucial structural role in the Chinese economy 
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were to be given just one trained manager and an engineer, an economist, and an 
accountant, then no less than 800,000 people would have to be trained. Some 100 
million agricultural workers would have to find work in other sectors as farming 
became more efficient, yet some 35.9 percent of agricultural workers were either 
literate or semi-literate. Population increase alone meant that 20 million extra people 
per year would have to be educated. Meanwhile, demand for highly qualified 
personnel in manufacturing, law, medicine and the cultural field would grow, too. (Li, 
K. 1993).   
 
The line that emerged from the Fourteenth Party Congress meant that in addressing 
these problems schools would have to make moral and ideological education 
compatible with an increasingly market-based socio-economic system, if Jiang 
Zemin’s vision of a ‘personnel great power’ (rencai qiangguo) was to become reality 
(Xu and Lin: 408).  In practical terms, as Li Keming pointed out, the 22.3 percent (4.3 
million) of children who did not even go into secondary education and the 60 percent 
of the remainder who did not graduate to high school were unlikely to stay on when 
the emphasis was on ‘cultural’ education rather than the kind of vocational training 
that was responsive to the needs of the local economy and society.  
 
The broad guidelines for remedying these shortcomings in the education system in 
ways that would not erode the authority of the Party had already been set out in the 
Central Committee’s ‘Outline of the Reform and Development of China’s Education’ 
in February 1993. According to this document, the rationale for reforming education 
is to win the world competition for economic and national power, which has become a 
competition in science and technology and over national (minzu) quality. Having set 
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education policy in a global context, however, the targets established by the document 
are very pragmatic. In some respects the Outline was more ambitious than the 1985 
education reforms, in terms of the aim to extend nine-years of compulsory education 
to all areas of the country and a strong emphasis on vocational education. Employers 
and work-based education, for example, would play a key role in raising the 
educational standards of those already in work. At the high-school level, there would 
be a movement away from ‘cultural education’. An expansion of places at technical 
colleges and vocational courses would take place. Higher education would also 
become more responsive to local social and economic needs, meeting the demands of 
local farms and enterprises.  
 
At the highest level, around 100 key point universities and a group of key point 
technical colleges would be equipped to meet the challenges of world scientific and 
technological development by the beginning of the 21st century. World class research 
would be developed by establishing a group of key point laboratories and engineering 
research centres. Opening to the outside world was also to be increased through more 
academic exchanges, borrowing from the successful experiences in developing and 
managing education of other countries. Students who studied overseas would be 
encouraged to return, cooperation with foreign universities would be strengthened, 
and personnel would be trained and research carried out in collaboration with foreign 
institutions.  
  
More politically significant is the degree of decentralisation proposed when the 
‘Outline’ grapples with the problem of reforming management in step with the overall 
development of the ‘socialist market economy’. Central to this is the enduring 
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problem of how to strike a balance between achieving coordination at the national 
level while not stifling local initiative. The general thrust of the proposal is for a 
decentralisation of management, with the province, autonomous region or directly 
administered municipality having the power to decide on issues such as student 
numbers, teaching plans, the selection and compilation of teaching materials, the 
duties of teachers and individual salaries. Central government would maintain overall 
control of the curriculum, standards, staff qualifications and basic salaries at the 
macro level through instruments such as the law, finance, regulations and information 
services. It would also play a direct role in running parts of higher education deemed 
to be strategically important for national economic and social development. The role 
of the Party in schools would similarly be limited to decisions regarding major issues, 
while executive personnel would be left alone to carry out their daily duties. In junior 
and middle schools, the Party organisations would still provide core political 
leadership, but not be involved in management.  
 
Ideological education is not absent from the ‘Outline’. Given the importance of the 
patriotic education campaign, though, it is significant that this is relegated to the 
fourth section of the report. Its content is largely familiar, including reminders for 
schools to raise socialists with the correct ideals, morals, culture and discipline for 
building ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. It is also significant that the 
‘Outline’ calls for education in national defence to be strengthened, with a 
continuation of the system of students at high-school and above taking part in military 
training. (156) Yet it is also important to note that the ‘Outline’ puts just as much 
stress on the need to make the content of education relevant to social needs and the 
development of modern science and technology. Teaching materials should thus not 
 105
just reflect the civilisational achievements of China and the world, but also the latest 
developments in science and culture. Localities should be encouraged to produce 
materials suitable for the specific conditions of schools in their rural areas. Technical 
and vocational schools should gradually produce materials compatible with they area 
supposed to be teaching.  
 
Ultimately, the use of the education system to disseminate the orthodoxies of party 
ideology was being limited by the demands of economic modernisation and 
professionalisation. Moreover, the role of the party and the state was being weakened 
by the need to pay for an expansion of the system through the diversification of 
sources of finance. As the ‘Outline’ explained, to date this had been woefully 
inadequate. In future, schools would have to make up the difference by not just 
looking to local and central government, but also by raising income from school 
enterprises and seeking donations from enterprises, individuals, from Hong Kong, 
Macao, Taiwan, the overseas Chinese, and even friendly foreign individuals and 
organisations. 
 
The Education Commission’s ‘Outline’ thus set out a bold reformist agenda for 
education that encapsulates much about the endurance of the ti-yong dichotomy in 
Chinese political discourse. As Li Tieying remarked on the ‘Outline’, what was being 
called for was a ‘liberation of thought’ and a reform all ideas and systems not 
appropriate for the demands of modernisation, an opening up to the outside world and 
the bold absorption of and borrowing of the fruits of human society. Yet, while 
speeding up reform and opening and building socialism with Chinese characteristics, 
there also had to be a strengthening of party leadership, upholding the socialist 
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direction of education, and the strengthening and improvement of ideological work. 
As he reminded his audience, Deng Xiaoping had remarked at the time of Tiananmen 
that great mistakes had been made for a time in ideological education, and that this 
should never occur again (1993: 27).  
 
The resulting 1995 Education Law thus makes clear that teachers are not only 
supposed to produce personnel who can contribute to economic development and 
‘uphold the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and the theory of 
building socialism with Chinese characteristics.’ Balancing the old ‘ti-yong’ 
dichotomy of using foreign learning to preserve Chinese essence, these new personnel 
are supposed to continue ‘the excellent historical cultural tradition of the Chinese 
nation (minzu), [and] absorb all the excellent results of the development of human 
civilisation’. The mission of teachers and schools is to ‘develop education, raise the 
quality of the whole nation (minzu), and facilitate the building of socialist material 
and spiritual civilisation’ (NPC 1995: 1293-4). 
 
To illustrate the kind of patriotic education that this entails, it is worth looking at the 
kind of teaching materials that have been produced since the passing of the Education 
Law.i As recommended by the Education Commission, school textbooks across the 
entire curriculum and at all levels are used to deliver patriotic education. Language 
(Yuwen) textbooks produced in Beijing in 1997 for junior school classes, for example, 
teach Putonghua Mandarin through the use of vocabulary and phrases such as ‘I love 
Beijing, I love Tiananmen, I love the five star red flag’, ‘I am Chinese’, ‘I love the 
motherland’, ‘My motherland is China’ and ‘The five star red flag is our national 
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flag’. Social paradigms are presented by learning sentences such as ‘father is in the 
PLA’, ‘mother is a nurse’, ‘the workers work, the peasants plant the fields, the PLA 
defends the motherland’. National symbols illustrate these lessons, such as Mao 
Zedong’s portrait hanging over the Tiananmen Gate at the centre of which flies a 
national flag, a water colour showing young pioneers saluting the national flag, the 
national emblem, buildings and places of national significance such as the Great Wall, 
and PLA figures and political leaders from the past doing good deeds.  
 
Stories from the civil war are also introduced as the Language course progresses. One 
tells of a fifteen-year-old girl communist fighter who is imprisoned in a temple, 
beaten and threatened with torture if she does not reveal her comrades when her 
village is occupied by the KMT in 1947. She prefers to impale herself on a knife 
rather than give away information, leading Chairman Mao to write the couplet, ‘A 
great life, a glorious death’. Among the new words that are conveyed by this story are 
‘turncoat’ (pantu), ‘kill’ (sha) and ‘dagger’(zha). The role of the CCP as saviour of 
the nation is also woven into the course material in the form of stories about heroic 
figures, such as the execution of CPC founder Li Dazhao, Zhou Enlai working 
overnight, the ‘poem of the revolutionary martyr’, the Long March, Chairman Mao 
announcing the founding of the PRC and the heroic exploits of a soldier in the Korean 
War. 
 
Similar patriotic themes are also dispersed throughout ‘Thought and Value’ (sixiang 
pinde), a kind of civics course that promotes selfless virtues such as hard work, study, 
respect for parents and teachers, discipline and thrift. Here junior school pupils are 
presented with the story of a peasant boy who leads a children’s anti-Japanese 
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resistance unit and is executed by the Japanese along with the rest of his village rather 
than give away information. The association of the CCP with patriotism is also 
stressed right from the beginning, with the first lesson being on the subject of the 
‘Beloved Leader’, telling the story of how an elderly man comes home with a portrait 
of Chairman Mao and explains to his grandson how grateful he is to the leader for 
having improved his standard of living. This is followed by a photograph of Mao, 
Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De at an airport, an exercise of practising singing 
‘The East is Red’, and simple lessons on national anniversaries used to mark the 
establishment of the CCP, the PLA and the PRC, and the special flags used to mark 
these occasions. 
 
Such patriotic themes and icons are gradually combined with themes more closely 
associated with globalization discourse as the curriculum becomes more advanced. 
Exercises in the junior school textbook for ‘Thought and Values’, for example, begin 
to associate Mao, Zhou, Liu and Zhu with the development of technology. The focus 
is increasingly forward looking, with a general emphasis on the need to study for the 
sake of the motherland and building socialism in the 21st century. The technological 
achievements of the ‘motherland; are also hailed, such as the PRC’s first successful 
satellite launch in August 1992, and increases in industrial and agricultural production. 
One lesson on ‘loving the socialist motherland’ uses the story of Deng Jiaxian, 
inventor of the PRC’s first atom bomb, as its subject matter. 
 
Within the context of the concern over immunising the young against foreign 
influences under globalization, it is also important to note that special attention is 
given to maintaining patriotism when abroad. This is conveyed by stories such as 
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those of a young Chinese scientist who threatens to withdraw from an international 
conference if the PRC flag is not displayed. Another tells of a delegation of school 
children who get off their bus to salute the PRC flag when they see it being raised by 
a hotel worker in New York. A lesson under the title ‘Study for the Motherland’ tells 
how a Chinese woman reading engineering in Germany receives the highest merit for 
her thesis after studying without a break for seven days a week, and having chosen all 
her topics to fulfil the needs of her country. Perhaps most importantly, having 
achieved such success overseas, she still returns to China because all of her study was 
‘not for myself, but for my motherland’. 
 
As the discussion of the political system is introduced, nationalistic themes are again 
deployed. The nature of ‘democratic’ decision making is explained by the way in 
which Mao Zedong chose the national flag by having a conference on the matter, 
listening to dissenting opinions, discussing them, and making a final decision based 
on the whole body of opinions. The lesson is illustrated by a painting of Mao and 
Zhou looking at a design of the flag, surrounded by various dignitaries. 
 
Other nationalistic themes that are introduced across the curriculum at junior level 
include the patriotism of the Chinese overseas, illustrated by the story of an ethnic-
Chinese Singaporean returning to the motherland to establish a school in Xiamen. The 
issue of Taiwan is also introduced through the tale of Zheng Chenggong, the national 
hero who expelled the Dutch from the island, which has been ‘Chinese territory since 
ancient times’. Such themes are further developed and reinforced at middle-school 
level, where the textbook for ‘Thought and Politics’ (sixiang zhengzhi) starts by 
explaining that the first quality of a good Chinese citizen is ardent love of the 
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motherland. The first three sections of the first volume cover ‘The Interests of the 
Motherland Are Paramount’, ‘Ardently Love the Socialist Motherland’ and ‘Develop 
Thought that is for the Service of the People’. Again the subject is widened to greater 
China, the civil war, Taiwan and national humiliation by the United States. As an 
aside to the United Front, the paragon of virtue is presented here in the form of a 
KMT general who opposes Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-CCP policies and is sent into exile 
in the US. There he takes to wearing a placard on his chest saying ‘I am Chinese’, 
after he is snubbed at the post office for being just that.  
 
The general narrative is one of China having moved from darkness to light under the 
PRC. Within this story, maintaining the tradition of opposing division and upholding 
the unity of the motherland that was established when Qin Shi Huangdi united China 
in 221BC is the duty of all Chinese. The fact that these territories include various non-
Han nationalities is not a problem, because all those living in the territory of the 
motherland have been turned into a cohesive force through a common economic life 
and linked cultures. It is explained that, without unification, there would be no world-
famous Chinese ancient civilisation and no long-term independent development of the 
Chinese nation, no 9.6 million square km of Chinese territory and no ‘great family’ of 
the 56 nationalities. History shows that when China is united, it is rich and powerful, 
which is why the constitution says that Chinese citizens are obliged to defend the 
unity of the motherland. Unification, moreover, is the historical trend and the 
common wish of the sons and daughters of China (zhonghua). In recent years, the 
common efforts of people on both sides of the Strait have has led to a situation in 
which all are looking forward eagerly to unification.  
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PERS0NNEL POWER: FROM ‘DENG XIAOPING THEORY’ TO THE 
‘THREE REPRESENTS’ 
A key function of this kind of patriotic education is to win loyalty to the Party from the 
growing number of professional personnel upon whom ‘building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics depends’. By 1995, Jiang Zemin could claim that there were already 18 
million personnel working in science and technology (1995a: 1392). Deng had given 
such personnel and their enterprises key role in his Southern Tour, during which he had 
marvelled at the speed of scientific and technological advance over the previous two 
decades and insisted that every business should establish a clear target that would help 
China to secure a world class position in high technology.  
 
There followed a dramatic expansion of interfaces with foreign scientific and 
technological activity and know-how through mechanisms such as the creation of 
science parks in cooperation with Russia and Singapore, the establishment of special 
high technology industry zones, and the creation of R&D bases in China cooperation 
with foreign high-tech firms such as IBM and Microsoft. By 1997 the Torch Plan had 
approved 12,606 projects in the areas of new materials, microelectronics and 
information, energy, biotechnology, and electromagnetic devices (Segal: 31-2). 
Chinese scientists were also encouraged to collaborate in international initiatives, 
such as the human genome project, work on global climate change, and the Euratom 
project. By the start of the 21st century it could be claimed that since 1978 no less than 
320,000 Chinese had gone abroad to study, more than twice the number who had done 
so in the 100 hundred years before that. Around 110,000 of these had come back to 
China, and the government was taking measures to attract more to return through 
local initiatives such as creating special industrial parks to act as ‘incubators’.  
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 While many young Chinese with a higher education had sought refuge abroad after 
the events of June 1989, the dependency of the Party on the new generation of 
scientists, technicians and managers was so great that a policy of encouraging them to 
freely enter and leave the country had been adopted and publicised. As Jiang Zemin 
told a meeting of ethnic Chinese experts at the third Symposium of China-America 
Engineering Technology: ‘There are Chinese people working and living in many 
countries in the world. They work hard and are richly creative, with their 
achievements in many areas gaining attention. This brings great pride to the Chinese 
nation’ (Xu and Lin: 408). By increasing the incentives for such people to move to 
China, along with foreign expertise, attracting some 440,000 foreign experts to China 
each year and sending 40,000 overseas, the aim is to create a ‘personnel great power’ 
(rencai qiangguo) (Xu and Lin: 408).   
 
As Jiang Zemin explained, however, members of the new professional class being 
created by such exchanges had to be reminded that they were the key force for 
realising the aim of ‘national rejuvenation through science and education’. Their 
historical mission is to divert their entire strength to building socialist material and 
spiritual civilisation. While upholding the Party line, they should be imbued with the 
glorious patriotic tradition of China’s intellectuals. In the present stage of history, they 
will have to protect the leadership of the CCP and devote their ideals and expertise to 
the great task of the ‘socialist modernisation of the motherland’ (1995a: 1392-4).  
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Such rhetoric might appeal to senior managers who have risen to their positions under 
the Party’s tutelage, making their loyalty to the CCP more secure. As Peter Nolan 
points out, a figure like Zhou Guanwu, who spearheaded the attempt to transform 
Beijing’s Shougang steel corporation into the worlds largest steel producer, was once 
the leader of a guerrilla unit in the anti-Japanese struggle. Not surprisingly, members 
of his management team saw themselves as ‘commanders in the industrial battlefront 
of steel-making, and developed a ‘mobilizatory, quasi-military and highly disciplined 
style of getting things done (Nolan: 669-70).  Yet this blurring of the lines between 
CCP organisation and industry is not only the case in heavy industry. Even a key 
sector of the new economy such as information technology is seen as having a 
strategic role in ‘building socialism with Chinese characteristics’, both because 
China’s leaders believe it can help ‘leap frog’ industrialization and also due to fears 
over information security (Hughes 2003). A typical example might be Eastcom, a 
‘private’ telecoms firm that grew out of the Equipment Supply Office of Zhejiang 
Posts and Telecommunications Bureau and went on to become a leading player in the 
mobile communications market. Seven of its directors are over 50 years of age, four 
over 45, and only two below the age of 35. The CEO and chairman of the board of 
directors, the 58-year old Mr Shijixing, has been distinguished with the Model 
Worker Medal for Zhejiang Province (www.eastcom.com).  
 
Another good example is Legend, China’s largest PC manufacturer and a member of 
the ‘national team’ of enterprises that have been groomed for global competition. The 
founder of this firm, Liu Chuanzhi, is a graduate of Beijing University who received 
his original training at the Military Telecommunications Academy in 1961-67 and 
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was selected from the cadre section of CAS to establish the firm in 1984. Hosting the 
ambition of becoming the world’s biggest PC manufacturer, this firm has come a long 
way since it was established in 1984 with funding from the Chinese Academic of 
Sciences (CAS), allowing it to win a domestic monopoly on the technology for 
inputting and displaying Chinese characters and the credibility that allowed funds to 
be raised in Hong Kong to enter the international OEM market in 1988. In return, the 
firm has played a leading role in building the infrastructure that makes possible the 
state’s plans for e-government and e-commerce. When Legend launched its global 
Internet strategy in 1999, it chose the ancient capital city of Xian for the opening 
ceremony, indicating its commitment to project of linking the whole of China to the 
globalization project. Re-branded for global markets as ‘Lenovo’, Legend made world 
headlines when it spearheaded the emergence of Chinese multinationals onto the 
global stage with a US$1.75 bn. bid for IBM’s PC unit in December 2004, making 
reality out of Jiang Zemin’s December call for investors to follow a twin strategy of 
‘welcoming in’ (yin jinlai) and ‘going out’ (zou chuqu) (PDC 2002: 191), which 
became formal policy in 2000 to take full advantage of WTO membership.  
 
By March 1998, Liu had been appointed to the National People’s Congress. His 
‘Three Factors of Management’, namely ‘Organise the troops, fix the strategy, lead 
the team’ (zuzhi tuandui, ding zhanlue, dai duiwu), is characteristic of the language 
imposed on his generation by decades of political sloganeering. He also complains 
about the loss of the ideals of honesty, seeking glory, hard work, thrift and patriotism 
in his firm since it started to recruit personnel from sources other than the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS) in 1988. He is not at all happy about the way in which 
members of the new generation of employees have become so interested in seeking 
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personal glory, are accustomed to good work conditions and are fully aware that they 
can take up other job opportunities if they are not satisfied with the treatment they 
receive  (Song, H: 200). Given that Legend has entered into a partnership with AOL-
Time Warner to provide Internet services in China, the national loyalties of its staff 
presents a real test of whether two decades of patriotic education have succeeded in 
inoculating the rising professional generation against ‘spiritual pollution’. 
 
The need to articulate an outward and forward-looking patriotism has thus become 
stronger, reaching a turning point when the final vestige of the CCP’s commitment to 
public ownership was dropped in Jiang Zemin’s report to the Fifteenth Party Congress 
in September 1997. With Deng having passed away on 19 February, Jiang not only 
raised the newly christened ideology of ‘Deng Xiaoping Theory’ to the same status as 
‘Mao Zedong Thought’ at the Congress, he also explained that the definition of 
‘public ownership’ could include collective ownership and share holding by members 
of the public. The acquisition of SOE stock by private shareholders thus became a 
form of ‘socialism’. While Jiang acknowledged that many workers would suffer as 
smaller and less efficient SOEs were sold off or dismantled, he insisted that 
‘Basically, what is beneficial to economic development is good for the long-term 
interests of the working class’.  
 
To strengthen the legitimacy of the leadership as he made this departure from the last 
vestige of socialist principles, Jiang presented this message within the full panoply of 
the CCP’s narrative of national salvation. Proclaiming that all the party congresses of 
the twentieth century had understood that ‘Our party shoulders a sacred historical 
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responsibility for the fate of the Chinese nation’, he made a favourable comparison of 
the present situation with that of China at the time of the Opium War and the near 
extinction of the Chinese nation at the hands of the Eight Armies, a coalition of 
imperial armies that had invaded China to suppress the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. 
After that crisis, the Chinese nation had two responsibilities: first, to achieve national 
independence and the liberation of the people, then to build a prosperous and strong 
country with common wealth for all the people. The conclusion to be drawn from the 
last hundred years was thus that: ‘Only the Chinese Communist Party can lead the 
Chinese people to national independence, the liberation of the people and the victory 
of socialism’.  
 
UNIFICATION AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERRUPT 
The development of a an outwardly orientated, elitist nationalism driven by the need 
to achieve the task of economic construction could only work, however, so long as the 
tasks of national unification and opposing ‘international hegemony’ did not impinge 
on domestic politics too much. As the sanctions imposed after Tiananmen crumbled, 
the transfer of Hong Kong approached in 1997, and Taiwan came to the negotiating 
table at Singapore in 1993, this was a feasible prospect. Yet the impact of events in 
both of these areas of policy-making in the late 1990s meant that more than the sweeping 
patriotic narrative of the leadership would be required to ensure the patriotic loyalties of 
the rising professional class to the CCP leadership.  
 
The first challenge to the leadership’s patriotic credentials was presented by the crisis in 
the Taiwan Strait that began in the summer of 1995, when ROC president Lee Teng-hui 
was granted a visa to visit the United States, and culminated in a military stand-off with 
 117
the United States Navy in the run-up to the island’s presidential election in March the 
following year. While this triggered the first wave of popular nationalism in the 1990s, it 
is notable that Jiang Zemin attempted to keep the focus of ideological debate on 
domestic problems. At the end of 1995, he thus opened up discussion of the right way to 
address the social and political problems generated by the development of the 
‘socialist market system’ by presenting a speech to the plenary session of the Central 
Committee in which he listed twelve major relationships that had to be properly 
managed by the party. These are the relationships between reform, development and 
stability; speed and efficiency; economic construction, population, natural resources 
and environment; between different levels of industry; the eastern and the western 
regions; the market and macroeconomic controls; public ownership and other forms 
of ownership; the distribution of income between the state, enterprises and 
individuals; opening to the outside and self-reliance; the centre and the provinces; 
national defense and economic construction; and building material and spiritual 
civilisation (Jiang 1995). The issue of Taiwan was not mentioned, even though the 
crisis was well under way by that time. 
 
Despite the sanctions taken by Beijing against the United States around the time of the 
election in Taiwan and the strong anti-Americanism that was developing in popular 
books such as China Can Say No (Song et al., 1996), both Washington and Beijing 
made efforts to repair their relationship. In October 1997 Jiang Zemin thus made the 
first visit to the United States by a Chinese head of state since 1985, during which 
billions of dollars of new business was cleared for US companies, including a deal for 
the sale of 50 Boeing aircraft worth about US$3bn. When President Clinton returned 
Jiang’s visit with his own trip to China in June 1998, deals for some US$1.4bn worth 
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of US goods and services were signed. With Beijing holding the value of the 
Renminbi Yuan during the Asian Financial Crisis and providing vital support for the 
Hong Kong dollar, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had a strong case to 
make when she urged Congress to renew China's MFN status in July 1998, putting 
global economic stability before pressure on China to make political reforms. It is also 
important to note that at the centre of these attempts to take nationalism out of PRC-
US relations was a major concession to China over Taiwan, when Clinton made a 
significant shift in Washington’s policy towards Taiwan in the form of a verbal 
announcement of a ‘Three No’ policy for Taiwan: ‘No one China, one Taiwan; no 
Taiwan independence; no Taiwan membership in international organisations requiring 
statehood’.  
 
The patriotic rhetoric of the leadership was also called into question by a perceived 
failure of the government to react to atrocities against ethnic Chinese Indonesians 
during riots that swept Jakarta on 13-15 May 1998, in the wake of the Asian financial 
crisis. Particular indignation was caused by reports that ethnic Chinese women of all 
ages had been subjected to gang rape, often in front of their families. When Chinese 
citizens showed their concern by holding demonstrations in various Southeast Asian 
states, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and as far away as Australia and the United States, 
mainland China was the stark exception. It was only after news filtered through to 
mainland China that students began to use the new medium to organise a march to the 
Indonesian embassy in Beijing (Hughes 2000).   
 
Of particular importance for the formation of elite nationalism is the way in which the 
Internet began to be used as the medium for such news to be disseminated. The 
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expansion of the Internet was driven largely by the government’s own drive to 
‘leapfrog’ industrialisation by informatising the economy and administration (Dai 
2003). Yet it was already showing less signs of leading to the kind of social 
liberalisation expected by many pundits outside China and more of a tendency to 
mirror and magnify existing nationalistic sentiments in the on-line population. The 
heated nature of the nationalist emotions that were spreading at the time is 
encapsulated by the message left by one correspondent, who asked: 
 
My mother country, do you hear the crying? Your children abroad are crying 
out. Help them. I do not understand politics and do not dare talk about politics. 
I do not know what it means to say ‘we have no long-term friends or enemies, 
only long  term interests’, and I do not know what these interests are ... I 
only know that my own compatriots are being barbarously slaughtered, they 
need help, and not just moral expressions of understanding and concern. My 
motherland, they are your children. The blood that flows from their bodies is 
the blood of the Han race. Their sincerity and good will also comes from your 
nourishment. Help them ...  
 
These nationalistic feelings encouraged numerous Internet users to call into question 
the CCP’s patriotism, ridiculing Beijing’s strong stance on non-intervention by asking 
how the Arab states would react if China started to kill its Muslim citizens, pointing 
out how France and the United States had intervened in Rwanda and describing how 
the British and Americans always stand together. The PRC, by contrast, had not even 
used its seat at the UN to promote sanctions against Indonesia and had actually taken 
part in securing IMF aid for that country, while straining under its own domestic 
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problems. Even Taiwan had taken a stronger stance towards Jakarta, responding to 
public outrage by suspending the supply of 200,000 tons of rice. Perhaps most 
significant for the evolution of nationalist politics inside mainland China, though, was 
the inevitable links that were drawn between Beijing’s conservative foreign policy, 
the patriotic rhetoric of Jiang Zemin and the CCP’s monopoly on power.  ‘It is quite 
simple’, pointed out one correspondent,  ‘You can demonstrate against the atrocities 
in Indonesia, but as soon as you demonstrate a bit about democracy, freedom, lack of 
human rights, government incompetence, official corruption, then how can the CCP 
and the “collective leadership around the core of Jiang Zemin” accept it?’ 
 
The largest foreign policy challenge for the leadership, however, was presented by the 
destruction of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on 8 May 1999 (Beijing Time), 
during which three embassy personnel died and more than 20 were injured. This took 
place as many in China were already seeing evidence of Washington’s conspiracy to 
fight Deng’s ‘smokeless war’ against the Chinese political system and way of life. 
The belief that anti-Chinese forces were on the rise in Washington had been 
reinforced by the trial of the Taiwanese-born scientist Wen Ho Lee on espionage 
charges. In January 1999, accusations that large numbers of Chinese visitors to the 
United States were engaged in the illicit transfer of militarily sensitive high 
technology to China were also made in a report by the Select Committee on U.S. 
National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of 
China, under Congressman Christopher Cox. In foreign policy, Washington’s 
increasing practice of humanitarian intervention around the world seemed to be 
consolidating what Deng Xiaoping had condemned as the doctrine of ‘human rights 
above sovereignty’ and the use of force to spread Western values (Chu and Wang, 
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1999). Such suspicions were further heightened when the Pentagon’s 1997 
Quadrennial Defense Review presented a strategy in which Washington would use a 
window of opportunity before 2015 in which it would have unrivalled power to 
‘shape’ the international strategic environment. The air raids launched against Iraq by 
the United States and the United Kingdom under the Desert Fox campaign of 
December 1998, and opposed by France, Russia and China at the UN Security 
Council, confirmed the dangers posed by US unipolarity. NATO’s intervention in 
Yugoslavia and its eastward expansion were seen as part of a grand strategy to control 
the Balkans and dominate Europe.  
 
Closer to home, Washington was seen to be encouraging Japan to develop a more 
active defence policy and the signing of the Joint US-Japan Security Declaration in 
April 1996 was seen as an expansion of the scope of Japan’s security commitments to 
include the Taiwan Strait. Despite the efforts made by Beijing and Washington to 
restore stable relations after the Taiwan Strait crisis, by the end of 1998 reports were 
already spreading in the dissident overseas Chinese press that Jiang Zemin was 
coming under intense pressure from the military to take a stronger line against the 
United States and Japan. This criticism reached a new peak when Jiang became the 
first head of state to visit Japan in November 1998, only to suffer serious humiliation 
when he failed to satisfy expectations at home that he would secure a new apology for 
the invasion of China and Tokyo’s confirmation of Washington’s ‘Three Nos’ policy 
for Taiwan. In December 1998, the Hong Kong based journal Zhengming claimed that 
more than 50 retired generals had signed a petition demanding that the CCP Politburo 
review and explain its policy towards the United States and Japan and demanded that 
Jiang should lodge strong protests and take sanctions against Washington and Tokyo 
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over their interference in the unification of China. The report claimed that a study 
session for high ranking cadres held by the CMC in November had turned into major 
criticism of Central Committee regarding policies towards the United States and 
Japan and weakness in Taiwan policy.  
 
This situation was particularly sensitive for Premier Zhu Rongji, whose main priority 
in relations with Washington was to secure agreement on the terms of China’s 
accession to the WTO. Zhu responded to pressure from the military at a special 
briefing for high-ranking officers held by the CMC in November. He was reported to 
have received a standing ovation for interpreting Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy line 
as meaning that hegemonic politics have to be opposed and that normal relations with 
the US depend on America’s adherence to the principle of non-intervention, 
upholding the principle of independence. Compromises would not be entered into 
with the Western powers in exchange for temporary benefits. Zhu also insisted that 
the leadership would demand that Japan should amend portions of the US-Japan 
security agreement where it threatened to interfere with Chinese territory, would 
oppose the revival of Japanese militarism and its designs on Taiwan. Demands would 
continue to be made for Japan to admit to the destruction and damage it caused during 
its invasion of China, and to make a correct summation of such historical incidents. 
Zhu also insisted that the Central Committee was committed to accelerated 
development and enhancement of military readiness, high-tech defence and 
armaments, with the doctrine of preparing to fight against a high-tech partial 
encroachment in an anti-Chinese war remaining unchanged and being given top 
priority.  
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The nature of the legitimacy crisis that Zhu had to deal with is summed up by the 
claim made in Zhengming (December 1998: 9-11) that at a dinner with PLA leaders 
and retired generals after the CMC briefing, he assured his audience that:  
 
Should the leadership one day stray from Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s theories 
and line toward the US and Japan - becoming an appendage of American 
hegemony, discarding the territory and sovereignty of the motherland - the 
entire population and the military are charged with the responsibility of 
defending national justice, to overturn and overthrow such a corrupt, 
reactionary ruling party and government! 
 
Whether or not such reports are accurate, this was the context of opinion and 
perception within which Premier Zhu Rongji visited the United States on April 6-14, 
with the aim of signing an agreement on the terms of China’s WTO accession. That 
NATO had begun the bombardment of Serbia on 24 March, made the journey even 
more sensitive. On April 20, however, Zhu returned to China without President 
Clinton’s signature on the WTO agreement. It did not go without notice that there 
were no representatives from the National People‘s Congress to meet him, as protocol 
demands. The NPC, under the chairmanship of the conservative and technocratic Li 
Peng then became a major source of the attacks on Zhu that ensued (Zhengming, June 
1999: 10-11).   
 
Zhu Rongji was thus in a vulnerable position due to the interplay between domestic 
politics and foreign policy even before the destruction of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade on. When that crisis broke out, hundreds of thousands of people protested in 
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cities across China, attacking the US embassy in Beijing with stones and eggs. U.S. 
Ambassador James Sasser was trapped in his embassy, guarded by U.S. Marines, as 
enraged students yelled ‘kill Americans’, hurled rocks and tried to storm the 
compound. Over the following days, students in Beijing shouted slogans like ‘get out 
American pigs’ and burned the American flag. In the central industrial city of Nanjing, 
they staged a sit-down protest outside a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant and 
plastered posters on windows saying ‘Strike The U.S. Economy’, and trade unions 
marching past the US consulate in the southern city of Guangzhou chanted ‘Stop 
American mad dogs from biting’.  
 
THE POWERLESNESS OF THE POWERFUL  
The most notable characteristic of the reaction of the leadership to this crisis is that 
the vital task of trying to maintain public order was given to the rising star of the 
Politburo, vice-president Hu Jintao. It was Hu that made a carefully balanced 
televised speech on 9 May, while Jiang Zemin did not respond in public until four 
more days had passed. Moreover, Hu’s speech on this occasion encapsulates how the 
ideological formula of Deng Xiaoping Theory could be applied by acknowledging on 
the one hand the right of the Chinese people to express their fury and ardent 
patriotism, while on the other insisting that the protests should be carried out within 
the law and that there should be vigilance against those who might take advantage of 
the opportunity to disrupt social order.  
 
The only concrete actions that Hu could offer on behalf of the government, however, 
were official protests and the demand for an emergency meeting of the UN Security 
Council. Aside from saying that the government reserved the right to take further 
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unspecified measures, Hu’s message for the future of foreign policy was that the 
government would not be moved from its line of independence, self-sufficiency and 
peace, resolutely upholding national sovereignty and the dignity of the nation, 
opposing hegemony and power politics. In a note of reassurance for those who might 
doubt the continuation of the domestic reforms, Hu insisted that the basic line of 
‘reform and opening’ would continue and that the rights of overseas Chinese and 
foreigners in China would be protected. The key political message was summed up in 
Hu’s last paragraph, where he appealed for the nation to unite around ‘the Party 
Centre with Jiang Zemin at its core’ and to ‘hold high the great banner of Deng 
Xiaoping Theory, the spirit of struggle, united as one, taking the great project of 
building socialism with Chinese characteristics forward into the twenty-first century’. 
 
The Belgrade Incident thus illustrates how difficult it had become for the Chinese 
leadership to match its patriotic rhetoric with rising domestic expectations for the 
country to ‘say no’ to the United States. The relationship between foreign policy and 
domestic politics had not only been complicated by factionalism in the Party, but also 
by the development of alternative channels for the formation of public opinion. Not 
only did books such as China Can Say No and the genre it established show the 
significance of a commercial publishing sector, but the Internet was also coming into 
its own as a venue for discussion. While American foreign policy since the end of the 
Cold War had encouraged the spread of the Internet to authoritarian states in the hope 
that it would bring about liberalisation, it was already clear in 1999 that public use of 
the new technology to air anti-American emotions was far more popular. 
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Faced by accusations of weakness, the Party organs could only go along with the tide 
of nationalistic anger. The People's Daily thus claimed that NATO had purposely 
‘spilled Chinese blood’', and the Xinhua news agency quoted a prominent Chinese 
scientist who was sure that the attack had been elaborately planned. On May 6, as the 
crisis in Kosovo began to unfold, all of the large papers in Beijing published a long 
article entitled, ‘The Chinese Academy of Sciences and “Two Missiles, One Satellite”: 
A Remembrance’, by Zhang Jinfu, former party secretary of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences. It gave a detailed recounting of the process that took place in the year that 
China developed the atomic bomb, a missile and a satellite. Discussing this article 
after the embassy attack, scientists at CAS expressed that they could quickly produce 
whatever national security required. On 10 May, as the demonstrations continued to 
grow, involving over a million people in the major cities, two satellites were launched 
on the Long March 4B rocket, the first of the year and reportedly arranged by the top 
leadership to demonstrate to the US China‘s potential capacity to launch international 
missiles. The following day, Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao announced 
that China had reached certain decisions according to the spirit of the Chinese 
government statement and in consideration of the current situation: to postpone high 
level military contacts between the armed forces of China and the US, postpone PRC 
consultations with the US in the fields of proliferation prevention, arms control and 
international security; suspend dialogue with the US on human rights.  
 
Ultimately, however, despite these gestures of defiance, the crisis of 1999 showed the 
limits of China’s capabilities to oppose American power. With Hu Jintao having 
established the basic framework of expressing patriotism within the limits established 
by Deng Xiaoping Theory, Jiang Zemin finally elaborated more on the nature of 
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nationalism when he gave an address to the nation on 13 May to mark the return of 
the dead embassy workers to China (Jiang 1999). Reiterating that the government had 
lodged the strongest possible protest with the United States and reserved the right to 
take further measures, Jiang acknowledged that the protests inside China were an 
expression of the ‘great patriotic spirit and solidarity’ of the Chinese nation and their 
determination to uphold peace and oppose hegemony, and that ‘The Great PRC could 
not be bullied!’ Having stressed the legitimacy of nationalistic emotions, Jiang then 
went on to describe how the post-Cold War international situation was still 
developing towards multipolarity, although the situation was still not peaceful as more 
countries were becoming alarmed over the way that the United States used its 
economic and technological power to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states. 
Humanity was thus at a crucial point in establishing peace and development, so all 
peaceful nations should unite to oppose hegemony and struggle to build an ethical and 
rational international order. What China was supposed to do to further this, however, 
was confined to Jiang’s insistence that the path of taking economic development as 
the central task that was established by Deng Xiaoping should be followed. This 
meant that: 
 
The whole Party and people of all nationalities in the country should take the 
great indignity and heated patriotism they feel towards the barbaric actions of 
NATO and turn it into a powerful motivating force, with one heart and one 
ethic and hard struggle to incessantly increase our country’s economic power, 
defence power and national solidarity. 
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Only socialism could guarantee the right conditions for this to take place, explained 
Jiang, because reform and opening is the ‘road to a great power’. While maintaining 
independence and self-sufficiency, continuing economic and technological exchanges 
on the basis of equality, ‘ceaselessly promoting modernisation by combining the best 
of Chinese tradition with the best of the world’s civilisations’. Naturally, in the 
process it was essential that all should be vigilant towards those inside the country 
who might take advantage of the situation to create social disorder. A peaceful foreign 
policy based on principles of independence and self-sufficiency and cooperation with 
all states would be developed according to the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence and under the leadership of the CCP.  
 
The correct interpretation of the speeches made by Jiang and Hu was explained in 
some detail in a People’s Daily article on 27 May 1999 under the title ‘Come 
Together Under the Great Banner of Patriotism’ (Huang 1999). This reiterated the 
stress on continuity with the reform programme and identified the leadership with the 
patriotic emotions of the public by agreeing that the bombing of the embassy had 
revealed that the doctrine of ‘human rights before sovereignty’ is nothing more than a 
new kind of imperialism, shattering any illusions that intellectuals might have held 
about the US. But its real message was to restate Deng’s view that ‘Only development 
is hard reason’. As the article explained, only the strong can avoid being humiliated 
by foreigners, so ‘we must transform our anger into strength, build the economy, this 
is the lasting guarantee of being able to hold the ground of not being defeated’. After 
all, went the argument, it is only economic power that enables the United States to 
punish those who do not bend to its will. Chinese history since 1840 has taught us that 
only the strong can avoid humiliation. What was important in the immediate present, 
 129
therefore, was to resolutely uphold social stability and the great unity of the 
nationalities, because ‘Without a solid Great Wall, where is there a secure home?’ 
The answer to the crisis, therefore, was to ‘resolutely take economic construction as 
the centre, comprehensively strengthen national defence and the armed forces’. 
Technological education was to be used to ‘revive the country’, and technology would 
defend the country, but only a high point of scientific development could be reached 
in the coming century. The only way to achieve the strength to face this complex 
situation was to follow the party centre with Jiang Zemin at its core.  
 
Maintaining this balance between patriotism and the priority of economic 
development became increasingly difficult, however, as foreign events continued to 
unfold. When, on 9 July, Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui announced in an interview 
on German Radio that from then on the relationship between the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait should be considered a ‘special relationship between two states’, the 
nationalistic fervour reached a new height. Reports began to appear in the overseas 
Chinese press indicating that the foreign policy line established by Deng Xiaoping 
was being tested by elements in the military. Zhang Wannian, vice-chairman of the 
Central Military Commission, was supposed to have stated on at least two occasions 
that China faced the possibility of a ‘New World War’, which would have represented 
a major departure from Deng’s principle that a world war was not likely in the near 
future. According to the reports, Zhang also argued that it was impossible to establish 
a strategic partnership with the United States while it was implementing hegemonism 
and gunboat diplomacy, and that the military considered US hegemonism to be the 
main enemy of the people. The attack had generated bitter hatred of the enemy and 
spurred the military to step up modernisation to fight a high-tech war against the 
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United States, predicated on fighting a war in the Taiwan Strait and opposing an 
offensive war mounted by United States and Japanese forces that would involve a war 
of resistance, attrition and destruction that would expand into a world war and with 
nuclear conflict hard to avoid. Given such sentiments, it is not surprising that when 
Lee Teng-hui was asked by the Voice of Germany whether Taiwan would share the 
fate of Hong Kong and Macau, he explained, ‘The crucial question is the Chinese 
mainland's overemphasis on nationalism and its failure to implement democracy’. 
 
FACING THE PAST-FACING THE FUTURE 
The numerous crises of 1999 had a special poignancy because this was also the year 
that marked the 50th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. The predicament that the 
sponsorship of nationalism had created for China’s leaders at the end of the 
millennium is symbolised by a front page editorial that appeared in the PLA 
newspaper, Jiefangjun bao,  on 16 August, which denounced Lee Teng-hui and 
warned that 50 years ago an outmanned and outgunned PLA defeated the nationalist 
army. Taiwan could spend ‘mountains’ of US dollars modernizing its military, but its 
forces would never have the morale to fight for a ‘1000 year sinner’ and ‘splittist’ like 
Lee. The PLA, insisted the article, is ‘willing to lose thousands of troops, but will not 
lose a single inch of Chinese territory’. Meanwhile, American and Japanese defence 
officials were busy signing a memorandum of understanding on joint research into a 
ship-based theatre missile defence (TMD) system. The PLA staged a massive show of 
force in Beijing with a dress rehearsal for the 1 October National Day parade.  
 
When Jiang Zemin delivered his National Day address to the nation (1999a), the 
ideological formula that Deng Xiaoping had put in place since the late 1970s was 
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reiterated. Jiang recalled how Mao Zedong had announced the birth of the New China 
50 years before, after which the Chinese people had stood up, followed by Deng 
Xiaoping who had set China on the road of ‘reform and opening’. Practice had shown 
that only socialism could ‘save China’, establishing independence after a hundred 
years of bloody struggle. Looking ahead, Jiang laid out a vision of the Chinese people 
devoting their strength and bravery to standing up in the ‘world’s forest of nations’, 
showing again how they could use their intelligence and ability to contribute to world 
civilization. Deng’s three major tasks remained firmly in place, as he explained that 
all of China’s nationalities would work together to build a new stage in the 
development of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. At the same time, they 
would strive to achieve complete national unification, and adhere to an ‘independent 
and self-reliant’ foreign policy based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
to stand with friendly countries in opposing hegemony and promoting multipolarity 
and a fair and rational international economic system. Ultimately, under the ‘great 
banner’ of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, 
China ‘a wealthy, strong, democratic and civilised modernised socialist China must 
appear in the Orient’. 
 
It is as part of this strengthening of the nationalistic rhetoric of the party leadership that 
Jiang Zemin finally made his own contribution to the party line in the form of the ‘Three 
Represents’, which proposes that the CCP represents the development of advanced 
productive forces, represents the taking forward of China’s advanced culture, and 
represents the fundamental interests of the great majority of the Chinese people. Based 
on a set of ideas that Jiang first unveiled in February 2000 during a tour of Guangdong 
province, it was installed alongside Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory 
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in his report to the Sixteenth Party Congress. It thus constitutes the ideological 
heritage within which China’s new generation of leaders has to articulate its policies. 
In this sense, its real significance is that it formalizes the status of the rising class of 
professional personnel as a revolutionary vanguard in the Leninist political hierarchy. 
The breadth of this new class can be seen in the way that Jiang told the Sixteenth 
Congress how the new ‘builders of socialism with Chinese characteristics’ that had 
emerged from the process of social change had come to include ‘entrepreneurs and 
technical personnel employed by non-public scientific and technological enterprises, 
managerial and technical staff employed by overseas-funded enterprises, the self-
employed, private entrepreneurs, employees in intermediaries, free-lance 
professionals and members of other social strata’.  
 
The kind of dilemma faced by the founder of Lenovo when dealing with the self-
interest of his younger professional employees had thus been resolved. As Jiang told 
the Sixteenth Congress, the CCP should unite with all people who ‘make the 
motherland prosperous and strong’. People should not be judged by how much 
property they own, but by their ‘political awareness, state of mind and performance, 
by how they have acquired and used their property, and by how they have contributed 
to the cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics through their work’. In 
the ‘primary stage of socialism’, it is no longer necessary to pay even lip-service to a 
class analysis of society, because ‘In building socialism with Chinese characteristics, 
the fundamental interests of the people of the whole country are identical, on the basis 
of which interest relations and internal contradictions can be adjusted’. While the 
world situation is thus moving towards ‘political multipolarization and economic 
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globalization’ amidst twists and turns, it is the representatives of the advanced forces 
of production that will work with the CCP to bring about ‘a great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation on its road to socialism with Chinese characteristics’.  
 
                                                 
i The author would like to express his gratitude to Father Dominique Tyl of the Socio-
Cultural Research Center, Furen Catholic University, Taiwan, for allowing access to 
his collection of the PRC teaching materials used in this section. The texts referred to 
are collected together in the bibliography of this volume for ease of reference. 
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